IT Confidentiality Risk Assessment for an Architecture-Based Approach by Morali, Ayse et al.
IT Confidentiality Risk Assessment for an
Architecture-Based Approach
Ays¸e Morali∗, Emmanuele Zambon∗, Sandro Etalle∗ † and Dr. Ir. P.L. (Paul) Overbeek RE‡
∗University of Twente
Email: {emmanuele.zambon, ayse.morali, sandro.etalle} (at) utwente.nl
†Eindhoven Technical University
Email: s.etalle (at) tue.nl
‡Partner OIS Information Risk & Security Management
Email: Paul.Overbeek (at) Ois-NL.EU
Abstract—Information systems require awareness of risks and
a good understanding of vulnerabilities and their exploitations. In
this paper, we propose a novel approach for the systematic assess-
ment and analysis of confidentiality risks caused by disclosure of
operational and functional information. The approach is model-
driven integrating information assets and the IT infrastructure
that they rely on for distributed systems. IT infrastructures
enable one to analyse risk propagation possibilities and calculate
the impact for confidentiality incidents. Furthermore, depending
on the monetary value of an information asset, we bridge the
technical and business-oriented views of information security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World-Wide Web [4] has fueled the deployment of a
plethora of electronic services of increasing complexity, like
on-line banking, cross organization interconnections to support
supply chains, etcetera. In some countries, health insurance
cards are replaced by digital patient IDs.
To exploit these possibilities, organizations have to store
valuable confidential information (like patient records, bank
account information, credit card details or client profiles) in IT
infrastructures that are usually exposed to malicious activities
such as hacker attacks via the Internet and insiders misuse,
raising the problem of dealing with the risks related to the
possible loss of confidential data.
The consequences of confidentiality breaches for an orga-
nization range from financial loss, to loss of market shares in
the private sector and to compromise of national security in
the public sector. According to McAfee Virtual Criminology
Report’2005, information theft is today the most costly form
of cybercrime.
To deal with possible losses of confidential data (i.e.
unauthorized disclosure), companies follow by now largely
standardized risk management (RM) methodologies, like NIST
800-30 [16], AS/NZS4360:2004 [13], OCTAVE [14], CO-
BIT [7], ISO/IEC 27002 [10] (ISO 17799). One of the
first basic step of any RM methodology is always the risk
assessment (RA), which - following the terminology of SP800-
30 [16] - is “the process of identifying the risks to system
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security and determining the probability of occurrence, the
resulting impact, and additional safeguards that would mitigate
this impact”.
When it comes to the management of confidentiality risks,
we argue that the main drawbacks of present mainstream risk
assessment and mitigation methodologies is that they do not
take the IT architecture of the system under examination. To
give an intentionally oversimplified example of how the IT
architecture can greatly affect the resistance of the system w.r.t.
confidentiality breaches, consider the IT system of a hospital:
if its web-server is on the same sub-network of the patient
database, then a hacker could work her way to the patient
database via the web-server, while if the two systems were
not directly interconnected, then this would be much harder.
Indeed, the IT architecture determines to a great extent how
resilient a structure is to confidentiality breaches and also in
case of breaches how much of the information asset it will
disclose (the damage is of a different magnitude weather a
breach leads to the disclosure of only a few of the stored
credit card numbers or all of them).
Since present RM methodologies do not take the architec-
ture directly into account, they completely delegate the issue
of distinguishing a solid architecture from a less solid one to
the specialist carrying out the RA.
The problem of distinguishing between solid architectures
and less solid ones arises also during the engineering of a
new system that has to deal with confidential information;
also in this case there exist no tools able to assess how
good an architecture is, given the fact that it should preserve
the confidentiality of the data stored in one or more of its
subsystems.
In this paper, we introduce the Distributed Confidentiality
Risk Assessment (DCRA) Model. By modeling how confi-
dentiality breaches can propagate through an organization,
the DCRA-Model can be used as a tool for quantitatively
measuring their actual impact (if needed, also in monetary
terms).
Also, the DCRA Model can be used to compare different
architectures and identify the best one to cope with the
confidentiality risks, given the (business-driven) value of the
data stored in it.
Furthermore, by including in the DCRA an estimate of
the risk the IT infrastructure is exposed to and of their
likelihood, we can use it to calculate the global operational
risks related to confidentiality an organization is exposed to.
The added value of the DCRA is that it can be integrated
with other methodologies in order to allow them to consider
the underlying IT architecture.
We argue that DCRA-Model assesses the IT confidentiality
risk intrinsically better than other RA methods and allows one
to measure how robust the system is to confidentiality risks.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section
II an over view of the related research in the field of IT
risk management is given; in Section III the risk management
methodologies are provided; in Section IV the framework for
modelling information assets is introduced; in Section V the
framework for modelling incidents and the formalization of
their propagation is introduced; in Section VI two applications
examples of the model for telecommunication and research
domain are given; in Section VII the feasibility for required
information in building the model is argued; in Section IX
conclusions and required future work is given.
II. RELATED WORK
AS/NZS4360-2004 [13] states that risk management can be
applied at many levels within an organization and recommends
embedding risk management into operational and strategic
planning. IT related risks are classified as: strategic and
operational [5].
Operational risk is defined in BASEL-II as “the risk of
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,
people and systems or from external events”. Compliance
with BASEL requires banks to quantify IT related operational
risks [11], including legal risk and risks related to business
processes of the organization.
Strategic risks are related to the high-level goals of an
organization. They may be quantified by setting them equal to
loss of market share, which depends on the monetary volume
of the market and potential loss of market share in case of a
confidentiality breach. Strategic risks are especially important
by calculating the impact of confidentiality incidents.
There exist various academic frameworks for carrying out
risk assessments, but they all differ from our proposal in
that they do not model the propagation of incidents across
an organization as precisely as we do. Furthermore, they
do not differentiate between methods of analysing different
security goals. We believe that differentiating between security
goals allow us to determine risks more accurately. From this
perspective we limit ourselves in this paper on confidentiality
related risks.
For instance, Lenstra and Voss [11] present a quantitative
approach to IT risk management to determine the optimal risk
management, strategy given a limited budget. Their approach
requires performing a risk assessment on all the applications
supporting business processes and identifying the (monetary)
loss due to each threat on the business process they support,
thus the risk is evaluated in terms of the likelihood and the
loss. Since this approach is designed to deal with threats to
all the three aspects of information security (CIA), to keep it
feasible it lacks in a complete representation of the constituents
of an IT infrastructure (machines, applications, etc.) and in
modelling the functional dependencies between them, which
is essential for properly modelling the confidentiality risks.
Our model, on the other hand, being specifically tailored for
confidentiality risks, considers the IT infrastructure on which
the confidential information relays on and the interdependen-
cies among them.
Another proposal is that of Aagedal et al. [1], who de-
veloped the CORAS framework to produce an improved
methodology for precise, unambiguous, and efficient risk
analysis of security critical systems. CORAS focuses on the
tight integration of viewpoint-oriented visual modelling in the
risk assessment process, using an UML-based approach in
the context of security and risk assessment. Although, both
our approach and CORAS are asset oriented, our approach
distinguishes by considering the IT Infrastructure in modelling
the risk propagation.
A further approach to risk modelling is proposed by Arnes
et al. [3]. They use Hidden Markov Models to evaluate the
risks of intrusion, and present risk depending on IT assets, as
well as define the risk level of a network as the composition of
risks of individual hosts. Our approach is more mature then,
in the sense that it also models the propagation of risks.
Furthermore, our model is designed to be used with standard
risk assessment methodologies. Ciechanowicz [6] states a
number of requirements for a risk analysis methods. These
requirements are group in 6 categories: common sense require-
ments, business requirements, functional requirements, secu-
rity, audit and control requirements. Our model is compatible
with Ciechanowicz’s requirements.
In our approach we model the relations among the system
components using so-called layers. The motivating idea is
that layers enable concentrating on different attributes of
assets, studying the interrelations between assets on different
abstraction layers, meanwhile remaining expressive. Eck et al.
[20] present GRAAL to provide a conceptual framework to
describe an ICT architecture in a business. It differentiates
between Business Layer (Events, communication channels
and stimulus), Software Layer (system transactions, software
library) and Physical Layer(Network topology, machines) lay-
ers. Our approach is orthogonal to GRAAL, since we use
the layered architecture of GRAAL for modelling IT related
confidentiality risks.
Another layered approach to risk management is introduced
by Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu [9]. Differently from our
approach, they consider the enterprise architecture, to model
the interrelations between stake-holders, business processes
and information assets. They use the model to drive security
requirements that are linked to the threats and integrated in the
risk management process. Our approach instead is based on
the IT Architecture and on the propagation of confidentiality
breaches. Therefore the two approaches may be used in a
complementary way.
Finally, our model is designed for supporting the dynamic
risk management process, as the authors did in [21] in the
field of availability risk management and business continuity.
As for the availability model presented in [21], this one is
meant to be implemented by a tool and used to assess the
risks in a continuously changing environment. This approach
is especially suitable for organizations where it is important
that the level of risk is constantly kept under control.
III. PRESENT METHODOLOGIES FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
There exists a number of standards and methodologies for
Risk Management, among which COBIT (Control Objectives
for Information and related Technology) [7] and NIST SP800-
30 [16] are of particular relevance to our work. COBIT is
the de facto standard for information control and IT Risk
Management, addressing IT Governance and control practices.
It provides a reference framework for managers, users and
security auditors. COBIT is mostly based on the concept
of control (be it technical or organizational) which is used
to assess, monitor and verify the current state of a certain
process (that may refer to procedures, human resources, etc.)
involved in the information system. To implement COBIT, the
organization must benchmark its own processes against the
control objectives suggested by the framework, using the so-
called maturity models (derived from the Software Engineering
Institute’s Capability Maturity Model [15]). Maturity models
basically provide: (1) a measure expressing the present state of
an organization, (2) an efficient way to decide which is the goal
to achieve and, finally, (3) a tool to evaluate progress toward
the goal. Maturity modelling enables gaps in capabilities to
be identified and demonstrated to management. Key Goal
Indicators and Key Performance Indicators are then used to
measure, respectively, when a process has achieved the goal
set by management and when a goal is likely to be reached or
not. Since COBIT does not suggest any technical solution but
only organizational solutions, organizations combine COBIT
and ISO 17799, applying the controls suggested in the part
Code of Practice for Information Security Management of the
standard.
As we mentioned before, current methodologies are not
sufficiently taking into account how information assets are
linked together and the way a single confidentiality breach
could propagate and affect other related assets. The fact
that COBIT and ISO 17799 do not consider dependencies
between IAs has even greater impact in the mitigation phase
of confidentiality risks: it is standard practice to protect the
information assets whose confidentiality has a greater direct
impact on the organization goals, while a more accurate
analysis in many cases reveals that it is more cost effective
to protect some of the information assets that have an indirect
impact as well.
IV. MODELLING ARCHITECTURE
In this section we propose the DCRA-Model. We fol-
low notable architecture frameworks, such as TOGAF [17],
Zachman [18] and ArchiMate [2] as well as IT Governance
solutions (IBM [8] and ISACA [7]), to determine the elements,
which may directly or indirectly be involved in leakage of
confidential information.
The DCRA-Model consists of: (1) A representation of the
IT infrastructure of an organization, consisting of a set of
Information Assets, of the IT Assets that they depend on,
and a set of relationships between them. (2) A representation
of estimated values assigned to the Information Assets. This
can be integrated with set of possible incidents affecting
the confidentiality of Information Assets, annotated with the
expected frequency estimation, measured in times per year
(See Section V).
The DCRA-Model is divided in 3 layers: The Business
Layer, The IT Layer, and The Physical Layer. The Business
Layer consist of business related events and communications.
This is the layer where the value of information assets is
defined1. The IT Layer is the layer where the interconnections
between IT assets are defined. This layer consists of the
applications, the middleware and the operating systems. The
Physical Layer contains the hardware, on which the compo-
nents of the IT Layer runs. Here we follow [19] in calling
information assets the semantic components of an information
system that “an organization must have to conduct its mission
or business”.
A. IT&I-Model
The IT&I-Model is the core of the DCRA-Model. In it, we
represent an IT infrastructure of an organization using a graph,
where nodes represent IT Assets and labelled edges between
nodes represent their relationships. The presence of an edge
from node a to node b indicates that the information stored in
b depends on the information stored in a in a way that, the
disclosure of confidential information in a may propagate to
the linked assets (in this case b), and cause the confidential
information stored in b to become disclosed as well. To
model this correctly, we refer to a measure (likelihood) of
this propagation occurring: we annotate each edge with the
“propagation likelihood”, i.e. the estimated likelihood that an
attacker that has intruded in a is able to use the outcome of
this attack for attacking b.
We model this probability in a qualitative way, as it is
commonly done in many risk assessment methodologies, such
as [16], as well as in academic works, such as [11]. We refer
to the following set of likelihood values L = {High, Medium-
high, Medium, Medium-low, Low, Null}, and to the binary
operator • on L whose behaviour is defined in Table I.
TABLE I
BEHAVIOR OF THE • OPERATOR.
• High Medium-high Medium Medium-low Low Null
High High Medium-high Medium Medium-low Low High
Medium-high Medium-high Medium-high Medium Medium-low Low Medium-high
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium-low Low Medium
Medium-low Medium-low Medium-low Medium-low Medium-low Low Medium-low
Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Null High Medium-high Medium Medium-low Low Null
1We address this in Section IV-B in more detail
TABLE II
IT ASSETS OF THE IT LAYER.
ID Description
a1 domain controller
a2 doctors PC at home
a3 doctors PC
a4 nurse PC
a5 admin PC
a6 patient database
TABLE III
INFORMATION ASSET - IT ASSET MAPPING.
ID Description / Value Location → Percentage
i1 patient data / 5 a2 → 5%
a3 → 15%
a4 → 10%
a6 → 100%
i2 user credentials / 1 a1 → 100%
a2 → 10%
a3 → 30%
a4 → 30%
a5 → 10%
Then, assuming that R+ indicates the set of positive real
numbers, L is defined above and V is the domain of asset
values, the IT&I-Model is defined as follows.
Definition 4.1: An IT&I-Model is a tuple 〈P, I, l−→, v〉,
where I is a set of information assets, P is a set of IT assets,
l−→ is a mapping P× P→ L, and v is a mapping P ∪ I→ V.
We write ai
l−→ aj as shorthand for (ai, aj , l) ∈ →.
ai
l−→ aj indicates that an attacker which discloses the asset
ai may directly disclose the confidential information stored
on asset aj with likelihood l. Furthermore, v(a) indicates the
operational value of the confidential information stored on a.
We should mention that dependency relationships are typically
AND relationships: an asset depending on two or more other
assets may be hacked even if just one of them is affected by
an incident. For the sake of simplicity, in this work we do not
consider OR relationships, even though it would be simple to
include them in our model.
From now on, we support the exposition of the model by
means of a running example.
Running example - Part 1: We present here an example
(oversimplified, to fit in the format of the paper) of the IT
infrastructure of a clinic, whose assets are listed in Tables II
and III. The IT&I-Model is reported on Figure 1. The edges
that connect the assets on the IT Layer and the Physical Layer
express the dependencies, and are annotated with the likeli-
hood of propagation of incidents between assets. The edges
connecting the Information assets of the Business Layer to
the IT assets on the IT Layer express that a given Information
Asset is contained in some IT assets, and are annotated with
the percentage of information stored on each IT asset.
Assuming that Alice, who is logged on to the Nurse PC
without authorization, scans the temporary files and finds a
doctors credentials. With Low probability she is then able to
use this information to log onto the doctors PC. Furthermore,
once she has penetrated to the doctors PC, she has Low
probabilities to disclose the confidential patient information
stored in the patient database.
B. The impact of information assets disclosure
To be effective, our model requires that to each information
asset which should be kept confidential (e.g. medical records,
etc.) be assigned a value. There are organizations that are able
to express this value in terms of money, e.g. banks, insurance
companies; for other organizations this can be harder. In such
cases the value can be specified in a more qualitative way,
e.g. using a linear value. The important thing to bare in mind
when using the qualitative approach is that these figures should
reflect the relative values of the information.
Finally, the model includes the percentage of each informa-
tion asset that is stored on each IT component (this is necessary
to establish the local impact of the disclosure of a physical or
information asset). The percentage of each information asset
i ∈ I stored in each asset a ∈ P is modelled with a M × N
matrix P , where N =| I | and M =| P |. For instance
according to Table III 15% of patient data is stored in PC-
Doc.
Assuming that, the vector ψ of length N consists the value
of Information Assets, the local impact vector v defines the
value of each asset, such that
v = P · ψ (1)
Running example - Part 2: According to the Table III the
value of Information Asset “user credentials” is set equal to 1,
and the value of “patient data” to 5. Table III shows also the
percentage of confidential information stored in each asset.
According to (1), the local impact of the disclosure of the
assets in the clinic example are as follows: va1 = 1, va2 =
0.35, va3 = 1.05, va4 = 0.8, va5 = 0.1 and va6 = 5.
Using the IT&I-Model in Isolation The IT&I-Model is meant
to be used within a RA (as it is shown in the next section).
However, it can also be used in isolation, to do the following:
1) Evaluating, for each component of the IT infrastructure,
which is the global impact resulting from a confidential-
ity violation. As a consequence, it is also possible to find
which are the most critical among the IT components,
i.e. the components with the highest associated global
impact.
2) Comparing how robust two different IT architectures are
with respect to confidentiality of information stored in
it.
We now indicate how we can achieve both points.
1) Global impact: First we need to define the global impact
of an asset a, which is the cumulative loss caused by disclosure
of confidential information stored in a, and the disclosure of
confidential information stored in assets depending on a.
Definition 4.2: Let vp be the local impact of asset p ∈ P ,
the global impact of p is defined as:
gImp(p) = vp +
∑k
i=1 li • gImp(pi)
where {p1 − pk} are the assets of P directly depending on p
Fig. 1. Architecture of DCRA-Model example.
(i.e. for which p li−→ pi) and li is the likelihood associated to
the edge p li−→ pi.
Since the IT&I graph is acyclic the concept of global impact
is well defined.
Running example - Part 3: In case PC-Nurse is cracked,
the confidential information stored on it gets disclosed. Ac-
cordingly, the local impact of this confidentiality violation on
“PC-Nurse” is 0.8 and on PC-Admin is 0.1. According to this,
PC-Nurse a more critical component then PC-Admin.
Looking at the global impact, compromising PC-Nurse
can lead to compromising a1 and/or a3 (and – iteratevely
– a6) corresponding to the following sequences of attacks:
Seq1 = a4, a1 and Seq2 = a4, a3, a6. The global impact of
(exploiting) PC-Nurse is then:
gImp(a4) = 0.8 +Medium− low • 1 + Low • 6.05.
2) Architecture comparison: For comparing the robustness
of different architectures (w.r.t. confidentiality risks), we cal-
culate the average and standard deviations of global impact
values of disclosing the confidential information stored on
each asset of the two architectures. The standard deviation tells
us how widely spread the global impacts are. If the standard
deviation is small, then the potential impact is almost equally
distributed on many assets. Otherwise, there are few critical
components in the system with high potential impact.
Due to space reasons, we are not providing any further
details here.
V. MODELLING RISK
In this section we introduce the concept of ”incident” and
we show how to integrate it in the DCRA model to carry out
a complete risk assessment.
Incidents are security related events affecting one or more
assets on which some confidential information is stored. Inci-
dents can happen several times a year, and Risk Assessment
methodologies [7], [16] always require to make an inventory
of possible incidents, together with their expected frequencies.
This information (type and expected frequency of incidents)
is thus available after carrying out a standard RA, though it is
usually expressed in qualitative terms (e.g. likely, moderate-
likely, unlikely).
Definition 5.1: Let P be a set of IT assets, an incident is a
mapping i : P→ R+.
In particular, i(p) indicate how often (per year) the incident
i is expected to affect the IT asset p. If i(p) = 0 then the
incident i does not affect p. On the other hand, by setting
i(p) 6= 0 we model the situation in which an occurrence of i
would causes the disclosure of all the confidential data on p; in
this case we say that i directly affects p. Of course, an incident
can cause an indirect damage by propagation, as described in
the previous section. To measure thus the global impact of an
incident we have to refer to the gImp() function (Definition
4.2). With it, we can compute the risk level of a system
Definition 5.2: Let I be a set of incidents and P be the set
of IT assets in the system. The risk level of the system is
calculated with the following formula:∑
p∈P,i∈I
i(p) ∗ gImp(p) (2)
We now apply this definition do calculate the level of risk
of the clinic example.
Running example - Part 4: Let us assume that we have two
incidents effecting the ”PC-Nurse” directly; an attacker could
break directly into the employee mail (i1) or get the nurses
authentication information by masquerading herself as system
administrator (i2). The expected frequency of these incidents
are respectively ”moderately likely” (which corresponds to an
expected frequency of twice a year) and ”unlikely” (which
corresponds to an expected frequency of once every three-
four years). The global impact for ”PC-Nurse“ is presented
as multiplication of the local impacts of assets (see Running
Example - Part 2) and of incident propagation likelihoods:
gImp(PC − Nurse) = 0.8 +Medium − low • 1 + Low •
6.05. Furthermore, the asset ”PC-Nurse” is affected by two
incidents, and according to Definition 5.2 the global impact of
incident i1 is moderately−likely∗(0.8+Medium−low ·1+
Low · 1.05 + Low · 5), while the global impact of incident i2
is unlikely∗(0.8+Medium− low ·1+Low ·1.05+Low ·5).
Integrating the IT&I model in RA methodologies: Most
RA methodologies currently used require assessing the impact
of incidents (intended as threats exploiting vulnerabilities).
For instance, [16], [5] recommends to use FIPS 199 [12] to
categorize the impact level as Low, Moderate, High, according
to a standard description of the effects of the incident itself.
IT&I-Model is designed to be used together with standard
Risk Assessment methodologies to provide a more specific and
architecture-dependant approach to evaluate the impact of in-
cidents, and it can be easily integrated in those methodologies
by using as input the incident information and providing the
global impact of those incidents as output. To make possible a
full integration we need to translate the output of our system
(which is given in term of a sum of likelihood-value products)
in term of the usual LOW, MODERATE, HIGH notation.
Although we believe that our approach is more suitable for
RA than this, since it allows a more fine-grained analysis of
the effect of a confidentiality incident, it is simple to flatten
our global impact into a single value. For the purpose of our
running example we adopt this mapping: if the impact value
is higher than the 10% of the total value of all the information
assets, than it is mapped as HIGH, if it is higher than 0.1%
then it is considered as MODERATE, otherwise LOW.
Running example - Part 5: Assuming that the clinic is us-
ing NIST SP 800-30 for Risk Assessment purposes. The risk
related to incident i1 on ”PC-Nurse“ is moderately− likely∗
(0.8 +Medium− low · 1 + Low · 1.05 + Low · 5).
Furthermore, IT&I-Model delivers a further simplified ver-
sion of the semi-quantitative risk value by assigning quanti-
tative values to qualitative ones. Respectively, the quantitative
risk related to ”PC-Nurse is: (0.1+0.05) ·(0.8+0.1 ·1+1.05 ·
0.05 + 0.05 · 5) = 0.18.
Since the total value of the information assets in the clinic
example is 6, and 0.18 is between 0.1% and 10% of the total
value, the risk level of incident i1 is therefore MODERATE.
VI. APPLICATION OF DCRA-MODEL
To show how to use and which are the outcomes of the
DCRA model, we apply our approach to a segment of the
IT infrastructure of a real-world telecommunication company.
Fig. 2. Telecommunication company invoicing process
The source of the information in this example comes from the
past working experience of one of the authors.
Part of the core business of a telecommunication company
consists of generating proper invoices for the customers of
the company by counting the calls they did. The invoic-
ing process is composed by a number of steps, which we
summarized in Figure 2: at first, the raw call records are
provided by the physical network infrastructure. The record
does not contain any information about the customer, but only
a reference to the physical telephone line. These records are
then enriched by the Post Processing application with the
customer information provided by the Customer Relationship
Manager (CRM) application. Since the data format used by
CRM application is too complex for the Post Processing
application, the customer information is first normalized by the
CRM Exchanger application. After the post-processing phase,
the enriched call records are then stored in the Operational
Traffic Database, where they are readily accessible for inspec-
tion by means of the Traffic Viewer application. Finally, the
invoicing application uses the complete call records, together
with the pricing information from the CRM, to calculate
the exact amount of each customer invoice. Furthermore, the
infrastructure includes other components, such as a complete
test environment for the Post Processing, Operational Traffic,
Traffic Viewer and CRM Exchanger applications, the file and
e-mail servers used by the developers, as well as the laptop
used by the employees of the company and of the external
consultants.
Since applications run on different hardware components,
the data is transferred from one to the other by means of
encrypted flat files. Part of the information, such as the source
and destination phone numbers and the customer ID are kept
partially encrypted inside the Operational Traffic Database.
Access to this database is also controlled by strong authen-
tication mechanisms and logs are generated for each read
operation. Encryption keys are kept inside a key repository,
and applications can access the repository to retrieve the keys
TABLE IV
INFORMATION ASSETS
Asset Loss (Eur)
Customer call records 100,000,000
Raw call records 10,000,000
Phone contract info 20,000,000
Phone line info 500,000
Test data sets 0
Application design specification 0
SW Test documentation 0
Encryption keys 0
Employee mail 70,000
and use the encrypted flat files.
A. Building the model
To build our model we start from the business layer: Table
IV reports the information assets that we identified, together
with the estimated (monetary) loss due to their disclosure.
The most important information assets are the customer call
records, the raw call records, the phone contact information
and the phone line information which have to be kept con-
fidential because of laws and liability issues. The disclosure
of the employees mail has a lower but still significant impact,
while the disclosure of the other assets is judged to have no
direct impact.
The IT layer is composed by the custom applications
used in the invoicing process and general purpose software
components providing services to the users or to other software
components. Table V reports the applications (top part of the
table) and infrastructure components (bottom part of the table)
supporting the invoicing process, together with the information
assets they contain and their percentage. The call records,
which are among the most valuable pieces of information,
are contained, in different percentages, in the following ap-
plications: post processing, traffic viewer and invoicing. Fur-
thermore, we observe that the CRM exchanger test application
contains part of the production phone line information. This
is due to the fact that generating fake data sets to test the
CRM exchanger application is too time consuming, and some
real phone lines are used for testing purposes. Moreover, the
mail client application contains both the employees mail and
the application specification and test documentation, because
employees are used to share documents by means of the e-
mail service. Finally, as expected, the Oracle server used to
implement the operational traffic database contains the whole
user call records; moreover, since some employees need to
regularly control the formal quality of the call records shared
between the various applications, some call record files are
stored also on the FTP cache of the employees laptops.
The physical layer is composed by the hardware compo-
nents on which the software runs; Table VI reports those
components for the invoicing process.
Figure 3 gives a complete outlook of the DCRA model for
this telecommunication company example.
To complete the DCRA model, we also need to assess how
the disclosure of information can propagate within the organi-
TABLE V
COMPONENTS OF THE IT LAYER AND THE INFORMATION ASSETS THAT
THEY USE
Component Information asset Perc.
Telephony network database Raw call records 100%
Post processing Raw call records 5%
User call records 5%
Phone line info 100%
Operational traffic procs - -
Traffic viewer User call records 100%
CRM Phone contract info 100%
Phone line info 100%
CRM Exchanger Phone line info 100%
Invoicing User call records 20%
Phone contract info 100%
Post processing test Test data sets 100%
Operational traffic test Test data sets 100%
Traffic viewer Test data sets 100%
CRM Exchanger Test data sets 100%
Mail client Application design spec. 4%
SW Test documentation 3%
Employee mail 1%
FTP Service - -
Operational traffic Oracle User call records 100%
Traffic viewer app. server - -
Employee FTP client User call records 0.5%
SAMBA server Application design specifications 100%
SW Test documentation 100%
MS Exchange server Employee mail 100%
Application design specification 70%
SW Test documentation 60%
Encryption key server Encryption keys 100%
TABLE VI
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
HW Component
Telephony network
Post processing server
Operational traffic server
Traffic viewer server
CRM Exchanger server
CRM server
Invoicing server
Employee laptop
File server
Network segment
Test server
Mail server
TABLE VII
PROPAGATION PROBABILITIES
Source Destination Probability
Traffic Viewer Server Traffic DB H
Key Server FTP Service M-H
MS Outlook Mail Client FTP Client M
MS Outlook Mail Client Post Processing App. L
MS Outlook Mail Client Traffic View App. L
MS Outlook Mail Client CRM Exchanger App. M-L
MS Exchange Server FTP Client M
MS Exchange Server Post Processing App. M-L
MS Exchange Server Traffic View App. L
MS Exchange Server CRM Exchanger App. M-L
Samba Server FTP Client M-H
Samba Server Post Processing App. M-L
Samba Server Traffic View App. L
Samba Server CRM Exchanger App. M-L
Fig. 3. DCRA model for telecommunication company invoicing process
zation. Some propagations are quite intuitive: compromising
a physical asset such as a machine implies that with high
probability the information contained on it will be disclosed.
Table VII reports the other, non-trivial cases, we have found
in this scenario, together with their estimated probability. The
first propagation scenario assumes someone has the control of
the traffic viewer application server: since the configuration of
the application server also includes the credentials to access
the Oracle traffic database, with a high degree of probability
it will also be possible to obtain the user call records stored
on the database. The second scenario assumes someone has
broken the key server and owns some of the keys stored
on it: with this information, one can access the user call
records by sniffing the FTP traffic transiting on the network
and then trying to decrypt them; the probability of this event
(medium-high) is evaluated by considering both the skill level
needed to perform this operation and the number of tries
necessary to use the right key to decrypt the sniffed file.
The subsequent scenarios assume someone gets access to the
test software documentation, this can be achieved by either
breaking the SAMBA server or the employee mail. In this case
the attacker can use the information stored in those documents,
such as the test credentials, the application behaviour (and
bugs), for different purposes. He or she can break the FTP
service to retrieve the call record flat files, or use a back-
door on the post processing, traffic view and CRM exchanger
applications to get sensible information. The remaining two
scenarios are similar, and assume someone has access to the
specifications documentation of some applications and can
exploit this information to bypass the security controls on the
post processing and traffic view applications, to obtain the user
call records.
B. Using the model
After building the DCRA model we are ready to use
it to assess the robustness of the IT architecture of the
telecommunication company with respect to confidentiality
of information. The first step towards the assessment of the
architecture is to derive the local impact of each component.
To do this we build the P matrix containing the percentage
of each information asset contained in each IT component
with the values from Table V and Table ??; we also build
the value vector ψ containing the value of each information
asset as reported on Table IV. Table VIII reports the resulting
v vector, corresponding to the total direct impact due to the
disclosure of information contained on each IT component
with respect to all the information assets it contains. Despite
it contains many different information assets, the Post Pro-
cessing application is not the IT component with the highest
associated amount, since it contains small percentages of the
most valuable assets (the call records) at one time. On the
other hand, as expected, the Traffic Viewer application and the
Oracle database containing the whole user call records are the
two most valuable components of the entire IT infrastructure.
One unexpected outcome from this first analysis is that the
CRM Exchanger test application, which should be expected
to have no importance, is worth 50,000 Euro. This is due to
the choice of using production data to test the application, as
we discussed in the previous section.
The second step to complete the assessment of the ar-
chitecture is to evaluate the global impact to the disclosure
of the information contained in each component of the IT
infrastructure. This way we can find which are the most critical
components of the architecture, evaluate the global impact dis-
tribution of the architecture, and subsequently check if the IT
components are protected accordingly to their real importance.
To evaluate the global impact we apply the gImp() function,
which takes into account also that incidents propagate from
one asset from the other. Table IX reports the results; when
applying the gImp() function we use the following rule: if two
components of the resulting impact vector refer to the same
information asset and have comparable values, then we only
include the one with the highest likelihood. If both the values
and the likelihood are different we keep both. As expected,
some of the IT components, such as the Mail client and the
SAMBA server, which at a first look may seem to be of
secondary importance, are more critical due to the possible
propagation of information disclosure.
The last step of our assessment is now to calculate the
average level of the global impact and its standard deviation,
to be able to calculate such values from a semi-qualitative
notation, we apply the following translation of the probability
values into numerical ones: High = 0.9, Medium-high = 0.5,
Medium = 0.3, Medium-low = 0.1, Low = 0.05. In this way we
are able to flatten the impact vectors and obtain a single value.
The resulting average global impact is 23,069,591.29, while
the standard deviation is 33,353,578.80 which is relatively
high, due to the fact that some IT assets have a global impact
equal to zero, while other assets have a very high potential
impact.
Concluding, the result of using the IT&I model in isolation
shows that the IT infrastructure of the telecommunication
company is quite heterogeneous: some components are at high
risk, while some others are almost safe. On the other hand,
the amount of critical components in this infrastructure is very
high with respect to the amount of non-critical ones. This
may suggest that the architecture does not present a graceful
degradation with respect to confidentiality violations, because
a big effort in protecting critical components must be applied
to several ones.
VII. CONSTRUCTING A DCRA-MODEL
In this section, we argue that building our model is feasible
in practice. In particular, we show that organizations already
have the majority of the input data we need, in the form
of IT architecture documentation. For instance, the GRAAL
framework [20] has been designed for architecture alignment
of business requirements on IT systems and is structured in a
form that is similar to our three-layered model. The GRAAL
framework has been successfully adopted as case study in
many organizations showing that the layered structure they
adopted is understood inside organizations and that any similar
model can be easily translated to the GRAAL notation.
TABLE VIII
LOCAL IMPACT OF THE IT COMPONENTS.
Component Impact (Eur)
Telephony network database 10,000,000
Post processing 25,000,000
Operational traffic procs 0
Traffic viewer 100,000,000
CRM 20,500,000
CRM Exchanger 50,000
Invoicing 40,000,000
Post processing test 0
Operational traffic test 0
Traffic viewer test 0
CRM Exchanger test 10,000
Mail client 700
FTP Service 0
Operational traffic Oracle 100,000,000
Traffic viewer app. server 0
Employee FTP client 500,000
SAMBA server 0
MS Exchange server 70,000
Encryption key server 0
Furthermore, specification documents provide us the infor-
mation about where and in which fraction information assets
are located in the physical assets, allowing us to compile the
matrix P reporting the percentage of the information asset
stored in each physical asset.
Finally, Risk Assessment methodologies already require to
make an inventory of possible incidents, together with their
frequency. We can find this data in the deliverables of Risk
Assessments carried out following standard methodologies.
One obstacle that one can find is that the likelihood estimation
is done in a subjective qualitative way, while our model
requires a quantitative approach. However, it is still possible
to solve this problem by assigning standard values for each
qualitative category (e.g. high = 0.9, medium = 0.5, low =
0.1).
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present a confidentiality risk assessment
model, which takes into consideration the interdependencies
between information assets and the IT infrastructure that they
relay on.
Although the necessity of considering the interrelations be-
tween information assets and components of IT infrastructure,
as well as protection of seemingly uncritical data, is indicated
in present methodologies (e.g. NIST SP 800-30 [16]), it
is not specified how this can be realised. Furthermore, the
research in this field is limited to assessing the risk for each
asset separately. Hence, the interrelations among them and
consequently the propagation of risk are not systematically
analysed.
his yields to risk analyses which are not as accurate as they
should be and which can not deal easily with changes in the
infrastructure (dynamic risk management).
The model we present in this paper is a proposal to solve
this problem and represents a first step towards dynamic
management of confidentiality risks. In order to validate the
TABLE IX
GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE IT COMPONENTS.
Component Global Impact
Telephony network database 10,000,000
Post processing 25,000,000
Operational traffic procs 0
Traffic viewer 100,000,000
CRM 20,500,000
CRM Exchanger 50,000
Invoicing 40,000,000
Post processing test 0
Operational traffic test 0
Traffic viewer test 0
CRM Exchanger test 10,000
Mail client 700 + L · 100,000,000 + M · 500,000
FTP Service M · 25,000,000
Operational traffic Oracle 100,000,000
Traffic viewer app. server H · 100,000,000
Employee FTP client 500,000
SAMBA server M-H · 500,000 + M-L · 25,000,000 + M-L · 50,000 + L · 100,000,000
MS Exchange server 70.000 + M · 500,000 + M-L · 50,000
Encryption key server M · 10,000,000 + M · 25,000,000
Telephony network database server H · 10,000,000
Post processing server H · 25,000,000
Operational traffic server H · 100,000,000
Traffic viewer server H · 100,000,000
CRM Exchanger server H · 50,000
CRM server H · 20,500,000
Invoicing server H · 40,000,000
Employee laptop H · 700 + L · 25,000,000 + L · 100,000,000 + M-L · 50,000,000
File server M-H · 500,000 + M-L · 50,000 + L · 100,000,000 + H · 70,000 + M · 25,000,000
Network segment M · 70,000 + M · 500,000 + M-L · 50,000 + M · 25,000,000
Mail server H · 70,000 + M · 500,000 + M-L · 50,000
Test server H · 10,000
model we are planning to integrate it to the case studies we
are going to construct with industrial partners.
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